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Abstract
This paper seeks to disaggregate concerns about energy security within the wider European neighbourhood from the nation-state to the household, and particularly to poor households in the transition and developing economies of the former Soviet Union. It argues that two decades of under-investment in Soviet-era energy, water, and communal service infrastructures threaten significant reductions in access to these services in the poorer countries of this region, particularly Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. These problems are manifesting themselves both in terms of growing physical restrictions on access to energy, water, and communal service networks in these countries, and in terms of rapid growth in tariffs for these services which could price some vulnerable households "out of the market".
The paper also suggests that these problems are apparent to various degrees in a number of other former Soviet republics, and that the impact of the global economic crisis is likely to exacerbate these problems. By calling attention to growing household vulnerability to energy and water insecurities, particularly in Central Asia, the paper seeks to bring an economic development perspective to bear on energy policy debates in the wider European region.
Poverty, energy, and household vulnerability in wider Europe
Until recently, the thinking of many actors working in the transition and developing economies of wider Europe was broadly informed by three sets of beliefs: (i) the strong economic growth enjoyed by most of the region for most of the past decade would continue more or less indefinitely; (ii) this growth would continue to both reduce income poverty and generate the resources needed to address (if not immediately resolve) non-income poverty issues (including barriers to access to environmental and social services); and (iii) institutional development in state, private, and third-sector structures, whose often inadequate capacities reflect the region's transition legacies, would likewise continue. This combination of expanding resources and deepening institutional capacity would increasingly address issues of absolute poverty/deprivation, and of unequal access to/exclusion from the benefits of economic growth.
Developments during the past 18-24 months have increasingly called such beliefs into question. The most obvious challenges are now posed by the global economic crisis-the impact of which has pushed much of the wider region (including its most populous countries-Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine) into deep recessions. Large declines in household incomes and employment, and significant growth in socio-economic vulnerabilities, have resulted. But even before the regional impact of the global economic crisis had become apparent, numerous warning signals indicated that the sustainable development returns to economic growth were diminishing-particularly in the region's poorer countries. Hundreds of thousands of households and small businesses in these countries lost access to reliable electricity supplies, and often to water and sanitation services. Evidence of accumulating water and energy insecurities in Uzbekistan, while less transparent, can also be found. and Uzbekistan, these tariffs were at 24-25 percent of cost-recovery levels; in Albania, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, they were at 50-55 percent of cost-recovery levels. A z e r b a i j a n T a j i k i s t a n R u s s i a U k r a i n e K a z a k h s t a n U z b e k i s t a n T u r k m e n i s t a n K a z a k h s t a n U z b e k i s t a n K y r g y z s t a n T a j i k i s t a n U S A E g y p t These price trends have three important implications for wider Europe's transition and developing economies. First, two decades of holding tariffs below cost-recovery levels (without offsetting fiscal subsidies) have resulted in the significant decapitalisation of energy, water, and communal service infrastructure. Hundreds of thousands of households and small businesses in Central Asia now spend much of the winter without access to these basic services-which, for many users, had been available previously. Second, and paradoxically, these declines in access are accompanied by significant levels of energy inefficiency and wasteful water use (see Charts 5 and Chart 6 above). The social objectives ostensibly served by low tariffs are increasingly facing the spectre of catastrophic infrastructure failure.
Third, the combination of urgent infrastructure spending needs and sharply higher global energy prices is now pushing up household energy, water, and communal service tariffs at rates significantly above national and global inflation rates, particularly in the former Soviet Union and Turkey. percent and 9 percent, respectively. The anticipated repricing of carbon-key to climate change mitigation prospects (both globally and in the region), as well as helping to further reduce energy inefficiencies-will put further strains on the region's energy inefficient economies, as well as on low-income household budgets. It will also reinforce the importance of alternative, renewable energy sources, and of reforming legal, regulatory, and commercial structures to strengthen incentives for their use.
Quantifying degrees and trends in household vulnerability in light of these trends is not a simple task. However, a set of rough-and-ready macro-and socio-economic vulnerability indicators is presented in comprise between one-and two-thirds of the consumer price index in these countries, and since (with the advent of the economic crisis) household incomes in these countries are either stagnant or declining, food-and energy-price inflation trends of the magnitudes now being reported can have a significant impact on real household income, food security, and access to basic energy, water, and sanitation services. The data also remind us that, for millions of low-income households in wider Europe, energy security is about physical access to, and affordability of, energy (and water, and communal) services; media reports about the "great energy game" between the Europe, US, Russia and China are an abstraction.
Poverty, energy, and household vulnerability in Central Asia
Because the three countries in the region classified by the World Bank 15 as low income countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) are located in Central Asia; since the poverty/energy/vulnerability nexus is particularly relevant in this sub-region; and as this subregion may face particularly difficult longer-term challenges of climate change adaptation (e.g., due to the melting of the glaciers), this section of the paper focuses on Central Asia, and particularly on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Efforts to address household energy insecurity in these countries face three sets of "unanswered questions" pertaining to the poverty/energy/vulnerability nexus, concerning: (i) the quality and quantity of data on access to reliable energy, water, and sanitation services;
(ii) the prospective impact of higher energy, water, and consumer tariffs on vulnerable households; (iii) appropriate mitigating strategies (for governments and donors); and (iv) the technological and economic feasibility of decentralised renewable energy technologies (small hydro, solar, etc.).
14 According to this data set, these seven countries accounted for 57% of all those living at or below the 
Access to reliable electricity, water, and sanitation services
Energy policy discourse in Central Asia sometimes suffers from a certain disconnect. On the one hand, it is not uncommon to encounter recent statistical references to near-100 percent household access to electricity services in the region, including in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. 16 Such references reflect a certain approach to energy issues in the former Soviet
Union, according to which most countries inherited quasi-universal access to power (and water, sanitation, and other) service grids from the Soviet period, and have since then The deterioration in access to electricity services that has occurred during the last two winters in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan further complicates the picture, in a number of respects.
First, reduced access to electricity often means reduced access to water, sanitation, irrigation, health, and other social services whose provision requires adequate electric power supply (e.g., for pumping water). Households that previously have enjoyed universal service access may in recent years have experienced growing deprivation due to planned or unplanned electricity cut-offs. Second, while some of the reductions in access to electricity services may be measurable (e.g., planned black-outs in distinct geographical areas), others (e.g., unplanned power outages in distant locations) are not. This complicates the definition and monitoring of deprivation of electricity, water, sanitation, and other social services.
On the other hand, some of the reductions in access to power from the grid have been offset by increased use of off-grid resources (e.g., diesel-fired generators, coal, firewood, dung).
But while increased reliance on off-grid power sources can mitigate the consequences of inadequate supplies through the grid, it often has undesirable side effects. These include deforestation, greater air pollution (including greenhouse gas emissions), increases in respiratory illnesses and domestic fire hazards, etc. Moreover, the marginal private costs of generating off-grid energy are generally higher than those via the grid (particularly during non-peak periods), due to the diseconomies of scale often associated with off-grid supplies.
In principle, the measurement and monitoring of deprivation of electricity, water, sanitation, and other services should reflect these variables as well.
These conceptual and data ambiguities have not surprisingly generated confusion in energy policy discourse in Central Asia, inter alia among governments and donors. In Tajikistan, for example, it is possible to encounter reasonable people making the following arguments about higher electricity tariffs-all of which seem equally probable:
• Higher tariffs will mean increased hardship for the millions of people who are living in poverty, due to both monetary factors and to the environmental and health side effects of increased reliance on off-grid energy sources (e.g., deforestation, dung burning). Instead of pushing the burden of energy sector adjustment onto vulnerable households, efforts should focus on improving management within the electricity sector, to reduce technical and commercial grid losses and thereby obviate the need for higher tariffs.
• While managerial and regulatory improvements within the electricity sector are important, higher tariffs are still needed to generate the cash flow required to extend grid services to those vulnerable households who do not now have them, and to improve the reliability of services for those vulnerable households who do have access to the grid. Higher tariffs can also reduce the explicit and implicit fiscal burdens associated with below cost-recovery tariff levels, thereby freeing up budget resources for expanded social protection of vulnerable households.
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• The extensive losses already present in the system mean that many vulnerable households already have at least partial (albeit informal) access to the grid, for which they may not be paying anything at all. Higher tariffs are therefore irrelevant. Measures to reduce losses and improve the quality of management are most needed to improve cash flow and investment prospects for services providers.
In light of these uncertainties, the degrees, trends, and implications of changing access to energy, water, and sanitation, and other basic services can perhaps best be measured and monitored via the application of survey techniques to vulnerable communities where there is clear a priori evidence of declining or inadequate access to these services (e.g., isolated mountain or rural communities, low-income households in town and small cities that have suffered sharp reductions in on-grid energy supplies, etc. • The extent, nature, and frequency of lost/inadequate access to energy, water, sanitation, and other grid (and off-grid) services;
• The extent to which this deprivation is correlated with other vulnerability indicators (e.g., income levels and sources; household gender, ethnicity, age, size characteristics, access to health care facilities, food security, presence of migrant workers in the household, etc.);
• regional and national energy and social policy reform discussions, within the framework of these countries' national development strategies. This is particularly pressing in Tajikistan, where sustainable, regular poverty measurement and monitoring systems are not in place.
The only source of poverty data is the Living Standards Survey, which is supported by the World Bank. However, this survey is carried out only once every three years (the last one in 2007) and is not representative at the district level.
How vulnerable are the poor to tariff increases? What are appropriate policy responses?
Once households and communities with inadequate access to energy/water/sanitation services have been identified, attention could turn to appropriate mechanisms to address problems of access. In broad terms, these mechanisms can be divided into two categories:
• Price mechanisms: Higher prices for these services are generally regarded by the international community as central to prospects for rationalising and modernising their provision. In principle, higher prices induce conservation, increase the financial viability of alternative energy technologies, and generate the cash flow service providers need to extend services to users for whom uninterrupted access has not yet been achieved (or has been lost). On the other hand, higher prices may have undesirable effects on vulnerable households-particularly for those who are already connected to the relevant grids, and whose low incomes may not easily permit additional expenditures for more expensive basic services. This raises questions of:
The timeline by which prices/tariffs are to reach cost-recovery levels (i.e., rapid or gradual adjustment);
The definition of the "costs" that are to be recovered. Various possible definitions-the choice of which can have very large and differentiated effects on the financial viability of the investment in question-include the: Short-run marginal costs of extending services to users/areas not (fully) covered;
Full private costs of ensuring the longer-term financial viability of the network, infrastructure, or company in question (including the large anticipated future costs of replacing depreciated Soviet-era capital stock); and External costs (greenhouse gas emissions, air/water pollution, biodiversity loss, etc.) associated with service provision.
How best to mitigate the social and environmental impact of higher tariffs.
Here, the options include:
Differentiated ("lifeline") tariff schemes, whereby small amounts of services provided through the grid can be consumed at little (or no) cost, but greater consumption occurs at higher per-unit tariffs;
Compensatory payments, whereby social benefits are targeted to those vulnerable users for whom payment of "full user costs" would be a hardship. This approach is consistent with simpler, more transparent tariff structures, and can reduce the administrative costs associated with measuring consumption, billing, and collecting fees for service. On the other hand, its effective implementation requires significant administrative capacity among social policy institutions (typically ministries of labour and social policy, and local authorities; sometimes also the ministry of finance)-capacity that may not be present.
• Non-price mechanisms: This more general category pertains to measures to modernise the management of utility companies, change the ownership, institutional, and regulatory structures within the energy and water sectors, and attract additional capital, technology, and know-how to these sectors (typically from abroad). Specific issues here include:
The extent to which the privatisation of state-owned assets within these sectors is to be permitted, and to which classes of potential buyers (e.g., foreign, domestic, etc.);
Of those assets that are to remain in state ownership, the designation of central-and local-government agencies that will execute the state's ownership and regulatory functions (including price/tariff regulation);
The extent to which otherwise centralised assets will be "unbundled", to permit (or encourage) the emergency of competitive forces in these sectors;
The consolidation of modern commercial principles into the management of energy suppliers, in such areas as:
More effective metering and billing for services provided;
Technical measures to reduce grid losses; and The expansion of pay-per-use cards (prepaid cards as for mobile telephones).
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The extent to which the companies themselves, and the relevant state authorities, are willing to enforce payment discipline on recalcitrant users. This can involve:
Ending formal and informal tariff subsidies for favoured users (e.g., the TALCO aluminium company in Tajikistan);
Being willing to invoke criminal sanctions and law enforcement mechanisms against large free riders ("fat cats") who use water and energy without paying for them (in part or in full);
Developing and implementing flexible solutions (i.e., short of criminalisation and "cold turkey" service cut-offs) for vulnerable households and communities whose access to energy and water grids has an informal or extra-legal character; and Communicating these steps to users and the public in such a way as to end the "culture of non-payment".
The possible impact of public-information campaigns to encourage households and businesses to voluntarily reduce energy and water use; and Increased budget or donor support for energy efficiency, alternative energy, and other related environmentally sustainable activities. Support for the introduction of florescent light bulbs, low-energy pumps and appliances, building renovations, or for environmentally friendly income-generating activities (e.g., reforestation) that can offset some of the unintended side effects of higher energy tariffs (e.g., deforestation), could be particularly important in this context. Important linkages between price and non-price mechanisms are often present. For example, the consolidation of modern commercial principles within a utility's internal management is often a precondition for accurately measuring costs and revenues, and then determining which activities do, and do not, recover their full costs. Decisions about the speed at which tariffs are to rise toward cost-recovery levels often have implications for the privatisation, unbundling, and regulatory strategies that can be pursued. These linkages necessitate some common approaches to and sequencing of various steps.
In both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, electricity, communal service, and (to a lesser degree) gas tariffs are generally regarded as being set at below cost-recovery levels-although it is not always clear exactly how these "costs" are defined. Tariffs for these services, and for water and sanitation services, are therefore rising steeply, as shown in Table 1 above. Both countries are moving away from lifeline tariff regimes in favour of simple, more transparent tariff structures and compensatory payments-and both (particularly Tajikistan) face difficult questions about the institutional capacity of state agencies charged with delivering these subsidies. However, whereas Kyrgyzstan (like most transition economies) has unbundled its electricity and gas producers (independent state-owned generation/extraction and transmission/distribution companies have been created) and is seeking their privatisation, unbundling in Tajikistan is limited to the gas sector. The Barqi Tojik electricity utility remains a vertically integrated state-owned monopoly; legislation was passed in 2009 prohibits the privatisation of strategic state energy assets. Both countries have sought at various times and in various ways to attract foreign investment, technology, and know-how into these sectors-thus far with modest results. Grid losses in both countries are extensive, particularly for electricity and water. Responsibilities for the provision of water and sanitation services in the two countries are shared (not always transparently) between local municipalities, ministries of water and agriculture, and other state bodies.
Viability of decentralised renewable energy technologies
In principle, the adoption of technical, managerial, and legal measures to reduce corruption and grid losses and improve revenue collection (particularly from large industrial users) within the two countries' energy sectors offers the best short-term prospects for improving energy security in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Important work is on-going in this area, supported inter alia by the World Bank's Energy Loss Reduction project. However, as the promise of efforts in these areas has for years dramatically exceed their results (especially in Tajikistan), and since the international community's abilities to impose such reforms on unwilling political elites are currently weaker than they have been for some time, significant improvements in corporate governance and management within the energy sector do not seem likely in the near term.
Instead, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are placing a growing emphasis on the construction of additional hydroelectric generation capacity, inter alia with large, multiyear storage reservoirs like Kambarata-1 (Kyrgyzstan) and Roghun (Tajikistan). These dams have become flash points in relations between these "upstream" and Central Asia's "downstream" countries, particularly Uzbekistan. But while reasonable people may disagree about their legal, economic, and environmental desirability, it is clear that these dams-if they are ever built-are at best long-term (10-15 year) solutions (or threats) to the subregion's water and energy insecurities. By contrast, smaller scale, less capital-intensive projects based on renewable energy technologies like small/micro/mini hydro, solar, wind, biogas, and geothermal power have much shorter gestation periods, and do not, as a rule, generate intra-state tensions. A growing recognition of the potential importance of alternative energy sources was apparent in President Rahmon's January 2009 call for significant increases in small/mini/micro-hydro generation capacity, to be put in place in Tajikistan Are decentralised renewable energy sources really the answer to Central Asia's energy challenges? Is small really beautiful? It is tempting to answer "yes" to these questions. In addition to helping to reduce Central Asia's carbon footprint, the expansion of decentralised renewable energy technologies could offer labour-intensive, community-based solutions to the energy insecurities now facing many vulnerable households and communities.
Unfortunately, efforts to promote the rapid expansion of decentralised renewable energy technologies in Central Asia face serious obstacles, in four areas:
Commercial viability: Under current electricity tariff structures, decentralised renewable energy technologies are not commercially viable in much of the region. In Tajikistan, donors who support micro/small/mini hydro projects (e.g., the Aga Khan Foundation, the Swiss Development Corporation, UNDP) generally provide significant subsidies to their projects. Seasonality: Water flow for micro/small/mini hydro plants is most plentiful in mountainous or upland communities. These are also the areas that are most likely not to be fully serviced by existing power grids-particularly in the winter, when demands on the grids are greatest.
However, winter is also the season in which the water needed for micro/small/mini hydro plants is most likely to freeze, and therefore be unusable for power generation.
Legal obstacles: The legal frameworks required by decentralised renewable energy technologies (e.g., feed-in tariffs, green certificates), via guarantees of third-party access to electricity grids, are not in place anywhere in Central Asia. Barqi Tojik's disinterest in purchasing summer electricity produced by small/micro/mini hydro power stations-which would in principle allow for more rapid accumulation of water in its reservoirs along the Vakhsh river cascade, or for increased summer electricity exports or water releases for downstream irrigation-can be explained in part by the absence of such an enabling legal environment.
As a result of these obstacles, both Tajikistan In light of the financial incentives-including unsure prospects for carbon finance under the clean development mechanism-now facing these countries, such an approach is understandable. Still, it would be ironic if-at a time of unprecedented global warming concerns-two low-income countries blessed with some of the world's greatest hydropower bounties were to address their energy security challenges via increased reliance on (high sulphur) coal. Not surprisingly, the donor community in Central Asia is somewhat uncertain about how to respond to these issues.
Conclusion
This paper does not mean to suggest that conventional approaches to energy security, in which the nation state is the lowest common denominator, are without justification. However, the events of the last 18 months have taught us that the conceptual paradigms underpinning (often implicitly) national, regional, and global economic and financial governance structures may contain important weaknesses, which are sometimes not recognised or appreciated until it is too late. Likewise, the impact of the global crisis on wider Europe is now pushing millions of people into poverty who had not been there before-or who had only recently escaped from its clutches. Despite falling global energy prices, household energy, water, and communal service tariffs in much of the wider neighbourhood seem likely to continue rising for the foreseeable future-particularly in low-income countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where household energy security is threatened by unfolding infrastructure collapse as well as by rising tariffs. In such circumstances, it may be best to treat the household or individual as the lowest common denominator when examining energy security and vulnerability questions. Putting vulnerable individuals, households, and communities at the centre of the search for post-crisis consensus may help to limit the damage done by the crisis itself.
